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Is Everything a Set?  Quine and (Hyper)Pythagoreanism 
Gary Kemp 
The story goes that today’s orthodox ontological view—that there are physical objects, and abstract 
or mathematical objects, and nothing else, with mental entities at most reducing in some sense to 
physical objects—was firmly championed by Quine.  True enough.   But he was the view’s firm 
champion only for a comparatively short time.  At the beginning of his career, Quine spent ten years 
or so resisting abstract objects, despite being the author of ‘New Foundations for Mathematical 
Logic’ and Mathematical Logic, works of no-nonsense abstract set theory.  In 1946 he wrote ‘I feel 
sure that nominalism can be executed, but I don’t know in which sense’ (CCE p. 23).  He published a 
piece in 1947 with Nelson Goodman in support, if qualified, for nominalism.  As late as Word and 
Object of 1960, to which one might well point as his most detailed statement of the ‘orthodox 
ontological view’, he gave a generous airing to nominalism, as if he wanted to examine it one last 
time, if only to show why in the end it cannot be ‘executed’.   One recognises the commonsense  
appeal of the doctrine that there are only physical objects, or even that that is just what it means to 
speak of objects.  But he also felt a tug in the opposite direction.  In 1964 he published ‘Ontological 
Reduction and the World of Numbers’, in which he examines not the proposal to reduce the world of 
numbers to physical objects, but to reduce physical objects to the world of numbers.  He explores 
the same idea in ‘Ontological Relativity’ of 1968, and revisits the idea time and time again 
throughout the rest of his life, notably  in ‘Whither Physical Objects?’ of 1976.   In the 1976 piece he 
called the idea ‘hyper-Pythagoreanism’, which I will shorten in what follows to ‘HPG’ (he called it 
‘Pythagoreanism’ in ‘Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers’ of 1964 and ‘Ontological 
Relativity’ of 1968).  Except in ‘Whither Physical Objects?’—which apparently he saw as superseded 
by the view of ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’ of 1981 (and Pursuit of Truth 1992 and From 
Stimulus to Science of 1995), and which does not appear in any collection by Quine—it seems that he 
never quite embraced the doctrine, but he never categorically ruled it out, and it did figure in his 
later ontological calculations (notably in ‘Assuming Objects’ of 1994 and ‘Naturalism; Or Living 
Within One’s Means’ of 1995; though not in ‘Structure and Nature’ of 1992).    
The later works feature such statements as ‘ontology as suffered a humiliating demotion’ that it is 
‘defused’ by ontological relativity, by which he means that although ontological questions remain 
real and substantive—contra Carnap— their scientific importance must be taken down a few pegs.  
But in this piece I will avoid for the most part the question of how Quine’s estimate of ontology 
evolved from his early views to his classical view as expressed in Word and Object, to his view of it as 
relative and finally to his final ‘structural’ outlook (for the story see Kemp and Lugg, forthcoming).  I 
will suggest that Quine could and perhaps should have accepted hyper-Pythagoreanism, without 
relinquishing any of his main commitments.   
One preliminary point.  Tarski proposed a criterion for a definition of truth in the form of T-
sentences: Any (consistent) formal theory of truth for a language is adequate if it implies, for every 
sentence of the language in view, a sentence of the form ‘S is true iff s’, where s is replaced by a 
sentence of the language named by S (Tarski [1956] p. 404). This is Tarski’s proposal for an explicated 
notion of truth.  By implication the point is extended to the notion of reference (or satisfaction, 
‘true-of’): for example if truth is equated with satisfaction by all sequences, then an explicated 
scheme of reference is adequate if it implies the right ‘truth-conditions’, in effect the right extension 
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of the truth predicate. 1  Thus two assignments of reference which entail the same truth-conditions 
for all sentences of the language in question are semantically equivalent, are interchangeable from a 
scientific point of view (if one is ‘materially adequate’, then so is the other; ibid. p. 405).2 Quine 
clearly accepts this.     
 
1.  I begin with Quine’s idea of a ‘proxy-function’.   Two features distinguish the idea.  First, in the 
simplest case, a proxy-function is a one-one function or bijection (later I consider cases of many-one 
proxy-functions) which for each object in the universe of the theory taken as argument, has a value  
which is distinct from the argument (ORWN pp. 217-8, OR p. 56, TT p. 19, PT p. 32; FSS p. 72). 
Illustrative examples are ‘singleton set of’ and ‘spatio-temporal complement of’ for physical objects, 
‘+1’ for integers.3  Second, the general terms of the language of a theory are re-interpreted to be 
true of all and only the proxies of the objects they were originally true of, so that where we began 
with ‘x is F’ we now have ‘the proxy of x is the proxy of an F’ (the same is carried out for relational 
predicates).  For example: ‘Spot is spotted’ now has the effect of  ‘The proxy of Spot is the proxy of a 
spotted thing’.  The two sentences are materially equivalent: in general, a sentence is true just in 
case its proxy-transformation is true.    
The point may be put as explicitly metalinguistic. Suppose a theory   is in view, and for ease of 
exposition assume that  has individual constants a, b, c and so on.  If the -example is ‘Fa’ then 
from a metalinguistic point of view we say “The referent of ‘a’ is something in the extension of ‘F’”;  
given a proxy-function, we say “The proxy of the referent of ‘a’ is the proxy of something in the 
extension of ‘F’”.  For dramatic effect we might abbreviate ‘the proxy of ___’  as  ‘*___’,  writing the 
second option as “*The referent of ‘a’ is *something in the extension of ‘F’”.   Using ‘referent of’ is 
materially equivalent to using (in every occurrence) ‘*referent of’.   
Quine’s conclusion is that reference is inscrutable:  Given what we’ve said about an explicated 
notion of reference,  a reference scheme is equivalent to any of its own proxy-schemes (FSS pp. 71-
5; TT p. 19).   
Quine does not consider seriously that the ordinary notion of reference might be subject to further 
constraints—causal  or epistemic constraints for example—than what I am calling the explicated 
notion of reference.  In ‘Ontological Relativity’ (pp. 29-54) it’s clear that he thought that there are no 
semantic differences in natural language that do not show up in behavioural differences, and any 
such differences must show up at the level of assent and dissent to sentences, which roughly has the 
effect of an assignment of truth-values to those sentences.  Suppose that we are speaking of one’s 
home theory, one’s total theory of everything.  We accept such trivialities as “‘London’ refers to 
London”; more generally we implicitly accept the schematic rule (of thumb) “‘t’ refers to t” (or “‘t’ 
refers to x iff t=x”) just as we implicitly accept the schema “‘S’ is true iff S” (PT p. 52, pp. 79-82).  We 
‘acquiesce in the home tongue’ as Quine puts it, as a way of putting our foot down to any purported 
regress of reference (OR p. 49).  Among our fellows who speak the ‘same language’—who use 
language more or less as we do—there is not normally any question of our speaking ‘of’ different 
things with our use of particular words.  This normal smooth sailing is simply a point about linguistic 
behaviour, a matter of what we ordinarily say, the phonemes we tend to use in particular situations.  
There is nothing stopping us from interpreting ‘the referent of’ as ‘* the referent of’, from ‘rocking 
the boat’, but the difference is immaterial.  For Quine, we are ‘free to choose’ amongst equivalent 
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reference schemes since one’s linguistic behaviour—in the form of assent and dissent from 
sentences of object language—would not be affected (TT p. 20).  ‘[V]erbal behaviour proceeds 
undisturbed …. Nothing has really changed’ (ibid).  
Switching momentarily to radical translation, the idea is that nothing in linguistic behaviour could 
tell us whether the natives refer to things or *refer to things.  As I see it, this just spells out the 
implications of the conception of reference described above:  that so far as reference is concerned, 
different interpretations which make true all and only the same sentences say precisely the same 
thing.   There are no immaterial referring rays connecting words to world, and no psychological 
mechanisms being posited.  The illusion that there is more involves an over-estimation of our 
acquiescence in the home tongue, or what comes to the same thing, our habitual presupposition of 
a background, familiar scheme of reference (whose statements include “‘London’ refers to London”, 
and so on).   
 
2. I have considered what might look like ontology via one’s monkeying around with semantics, with 
the interpretation of language.  Quine often does so.  But ontology does not have be considered 
semantically.  In fact nothing in the argument to follow depends on the relativity of ontology or 
purported indeterminacy of semantics.  Besides objections attacking the thesis that explicated 
conception of reference is scientifically all that can be salvaged from the commonsense notion of 
reference, one might be wary of theorising wholly from ‘outside’ one’s theory or conceptual scheme, 
from a transcendental as opposed to an immanent point of view (bumping up on the limits of 
language, to add some Wittgensteinian spin; see TT pp. 21-2, 180; cf. PL pp. 19, 22).   I’m not saying 
by any means that Quine himself is guilty of this.  A central part of Quine’s outlook is that 
philosophy, like any legitimate theoretical pursuit, must take place aboard Neurath’s ship—the ship 
that is repaired while sailing the open seas.   He said ‘The world is as natural science says it is, insofar 
as natural science is right’ (SN p. 405); in ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, having just laid out the 
argument from proxy-functions, he writes:     
… I expressed … my unswerving belief in external things—people, nerve endings, sticks, 
stones….How is all this robust realism to be reconciled with the barren scene that I have 
been depicting? The answer is naturalism: The recognition that it is within science itself, and 
not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described. (TT p. 21) 
Semantics, in what for Quine is an empirically ill-founded sense, a theory that promises to tell us the 
uniquely right reference relation amongst empirically equivalent schemes, is an example of a would-
be super-naturalist, pretending to a transcendent or god’s eye enterprise, issuing from ‘some prior 
philosophy’.  Ontology, if it is to be a legitimate theoretical pursuit, must admit of being pursued 
within ‘our theory’ or language (in Kemp 2016 I claimed that this consideration shows that a 
Quinean can discount the spectre of the global underdetermination of theory).  Proper ontological 
questions are at bottom just maximally general existence questions, related to ordinary existence 
questions in the way that ‘Are there physical objects?’ is to ‘Are there wombats in New Zealand?’.  
Neither is especially a semantical question. Thus I propose to leave the issues of semantical 
determinacy aside in this section.  I will speak occasionally of ‘reference’ but nothing I argue for 
depends on reference going inscrutable.  
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3. To the unwary, it often seems that Quine’s contention is that the mere existence of proxy-
functions forces one to relativise ontology wholesale.  For example he writes: ‘The conclusion is that 
there can be no evidence for one ontology as over against another, so long anyway as we can 
express a one-to-one correlation between them.  Save the structure and you save all’ (SN p. 405; see 
also TT p. 19, PT pp. 31-32).  But a moment’s reflection shows the application of a proxy-function 
needn’t change the universe—the sum total of existing things—at all, as in ‘cosmic complement of’ 
(the universe minus the object): a theory must needs comprehend objects and their cosmic 
complements to begin with.   The extensions of particular terms trade places; the extensions of 
terms are swapped for their proxies.  But the things which exist according to the theory as a whole 
may remain as they were; one can well-understand the reaction that an ontology and its proxy-
alternative amount to the same, that they ‘say the same thing’.   By contrast, HPG shows how certain 
proxy-functions pare down a given universe, i.e., how its range can be a proper subset of its domain.  
Again, the argument does not depend on any controversial semantical considerations. And by the 
way, for Quine, there is no paradox about one’s having to recognise certain entities in order to 
disown them:  the argument can be taken as a reductio of the supposition that there are certain 
entities, the ones the argument licenses one to disown (OR p. 58; cf. ORWN p. 215).  
Now before finally discussing HPG itself it may help to have before us a quick sketch of Quine’s view 
of the place of physics.  Physics is ‘basic’ for Quine in that it ‘discover[s] the ultimate constituents of 
the world and their regularities’ (CCE p. 166).  That is not to say that other sciences are reducible to 
physics, but they do not add to ontology:  ‘Other sciences that are likewise concerned to discover 
regularities in the world are the for the most part not derivable from physics, but only because their 
objects are excessively complex aggregates of physical elements’ (ibid).  Descriptions, predicates and 
laws of the special sciences may be irreducible ‘[b]ut the behavior of these gross objects is … the 
sum of the behavior of the ultimate physical constituents, however incalculable’ (ibid; Quine’s 
emphasis).  Clearly the notion of ‘the physical’ is post-Newton, post-Einstein, and post-quantum 
theory: by definition it aims to encompass the ‘ultimate constituents of the world and their 
regularities’; it includes the latest discoveries within physics but it is not beholden to physics as 
presently constituted, for ‘[t]he objective is just full coverage of the ultimate ingredients and forces 
of the world, whatever they may be’ (ibid).   
The takeaway is simply that for Quine, the question of the ontology of science just is that of the 
ontology of physics.   
HPG appears in Quine’s published work for the first time in 1964, in ‘Ontological Reduction and the 
World of Numbers’.  Responding to George Berry’s idea that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem—that 
any true theory has a model with a universe wholly within the natural numbers—implies that only 
‘common sense stands in the way of adopting an all-purpose Pythagorean ontology: natural 
numbers exclusively’ (OWRN p. 214), Quine replies that on the contrary there is something standing 
the way: To say that there is such a model is not enough to specify an actual interpretation in the 
natural numbers (p. 215, p. 219; but see also PT p. 31-33).  The problem is not that the predicates of 
a theory which has been subjected to Löwenheim-Skolem would not be effective or arithmetical 
(although that is true).  The crucial consideration is simply that the Löwenheim-Skolem argument 
generates no recipe for identifying a function which takes any object from the original theory as 
input and yields a natural number as output; in fact Löwenheim-Skolem does not itself provide 
assurance that such a function exists (ORWN p. 219, OR p. 62; he pointed out later that we might 
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thanks to an ‘extraordinary coincidence’ be vouchsafed such a function, but the argument for the 
theorem provides no clue as to what it is; WPO? p. 503).4  ‘Ontological Relativity’ adds further 
considerations, but the general picture and result are the same.  
That is why ‘Whither Physical Objects?’ counts as progress, for now it appears that one can specify a 
proxy-function whose images lie within the realm of numbers, which can be understood via various 
means as abstract classes (Frege, Zermelo, von Neumann etc.); it therefore counts as a ‘genuine 
reduction’ by the lights of ‘Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers’.  The argument is 
sometimes called the ‘Argument from Physics’, because it uses certain considerations from physics 
to specify a (now many-one) proxy-function.  
We first make precise the notion of a physical object or body as ‘as the aggregate material content 
of any portion of space-time, however ragged and discontinuous’ (WPO? p. 497).  But the idea of 
‘material content’ is not itself well-behaved, because according to physics it makes no sense to speak 
of material content—for example an electron—as always being identified over time:  
It is sometimes wholly arbitrary to say whether two points events a and b are moments in 
the career of one continuing electron or moments rather in the careers of two different 
electrons.  The point event a is followed by b, and meanwhile another nearby point event c 
is followed by d; and it can be a wholly arbitrary matter whether to assign a and b to one 
electron, c and d to another, or to assign them crosswise: a and d to one electron, c and b to 
another.  What are objective are, at best, the point events. (p. 498). 
Further considerations show that ‘point events’ remain too ‘classical’, in that they are likewise not 
free of arbitrariness:  
Thus consider … the east box and the west box, and two electrons x and y. Common sense 
recognises four ways in which x and y could occupy the boxes: they could both be in the east 
box, or both be in the west box, or x could be in the east box and y in the west, or vice versa.  
But statistical findings show … that these last two apparent possibilities have be counted as 
just one … the moral is that we should think not of individual electrons x and y at all, but of 
states of the boxes .. (pp. 498-9) 
Point-events, inasmuch as they are infinitesimal temporal and spatial slices of particles, entail that 
the two possibilities remain two.  Electrons are just one example; other particles—in particular other 
‘fermions’ such as protons, neutrons, and leptons—are subject to the same indeterminacies.5 ‘We 
are left … with a field theory, a theory of the distribution of states over space-time’ (p. 499).  Quine 
is quick to add that the states or magnitudes themselves—temperature, length, charge, mass etc.—
do not have to figure in the ontology, as entities themselves.  The state-types figure in the theory 
merely as open sentences or predicates, which as a matter of longstanding principle Quine does not 
quantify over, does not explain as standing for properties or entities of any sort.6  As long as we have 
numbers at our disposal, then there will be, for any measurable magnitude—temperature for 
example—relational predicates of the form ‘the temperature of  is x’, where  is a field and x is a 
real number (we could understand them as functions from fields to real numbers as at WPO? p. 503, 
but such functions would not add to ontology; see the next paragraph).7    
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By this time Quine has bid adieu to Nominalism; he is assuming that the ‘full mathematical 
apparatus’ must remain part of the ontological picture.  Thus since mathematics reduces to pure set 
theory, one can identify space-time points themselves as quadruples of real numbers—x, y, z, t with 
t representing time—in the Cartesian fashion, and then space-time regions in turn as sets of points 
(p. 501). Thus ‘physical objects have evaporated into mere sets of numerical coordinates’ (p. 502; 
those sets are elsewhere called ‘number tables’: CCE p. 457, 470; FSS pp. 71-2).  But that those are 
the objects does not imply that physics reduces to mathematics or set theory or let alone that 
statements of physics are provable; for it does not imply that the predicates we use to talk about the 
objects are themselves predicates of mathematics or set theory, or that they are recursive or 
arithmetically definable (WPO? p. 503).  The twin lexicons ‘stand stubbornly apart’ (ibid).  
Quine seems to have withdrawn his support for this argument almost immediately.  He no longer 
positively asserts its conclusion after 1976, does not except for that one time assert that everything 
is a set.  In ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’ of 1981, although he does mention in passing the 
possibility of HPG, he placed more emphasis on the argument from one-to-one proxy-functions to 
show that ontology is not so important as he once thought, that the real lesson is what he calls 
global structuralism.  As hinted above, this is not to say that structures are all that exist.  Speaking 
from within our theory or language, his view is that what exist rather are rabbits, electrons and 
numbers, even though one’s evidence for saying so is equally evidence for espousing the existence 
of some proxy-equivalent alternative (SN pp. 405-6; though as above doubts can be raised about 
whether these alternatives are genuinely alternatives).   
4.  Quine says over and over that the notion of kind of object, and even the general notion of an 
object, are man-made, that objects are all posits (WO pp. 21-5; TT pp. 1, 8-15).  All reification, all 
objects, properly speaking, are in a certain broad sense theoretical  (TT p. 20).  There is a continuum 
from the familiar ‘posits’ we gain the capacity to refer to as infants learning language to the more 
abstruse posits we refer to as relative grown-ups such as quasars, quarks and transfinite cardinals.  
They are all in the same boat epistemologically, differing only by the degree of conceptual 
sophistication involved in facility with the relevant language.  We speak not just of quarks but also 
ordinary bodies such as rabbits thanks to our concepts, or our words, some of which are deliberately 
formulated but others handed down in at least rough form by evolution or culture.  We might have 
had others, and some, or most, are renounced as science formulates its official doctrines.  For the 
ontologist anyway, minded to regiment, it does not matter how they got to where they’ve got; all of 
it is on a level, and he desires to formulate the smoothest and most economical scheme he can.  And 
Quine did not ever, so far as I know, forswear his allegiance to Occam’s maxim.   So why not go 
hyper-Pythagorean?    
Two points that repeat material above, then two new points (though they are due to Quine himself).  
First, one-to-one proxy-functions alone needn’t move the ontologist:  he might just go along with 
the proxies-idea, saying ‘The proxy of x is a proxy of F’ whenever he wanted to say what he used to 
say by ‘Fx’, so long as the overall ontology remains as it was.  The overall ontology is the game he’s 
interested in.    
Second, one can make such a judgement as HPG recommends from an immanent point of view, 
from inside one’s theory, from aboard one’s Neurathean ship; there is no sense in which the 
judgement must be made from a transcendent point view, entirely bracketing all ontological 
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commitment.  We are not considering alternative schemes of reference, where we have to consider 
our language as whole, and consider alternative ways of interpreting it from some other point of 
view. The Argument from Physics is no more reliant on a global metaperspective than any other 
question of what there is, like whether Venus has any moons. It’s simply an attempt to answer the 
immanent and non-linguistic question ‘What is there?’.   
And now the two new points.   
First, the place where I think Quine could have taken another line is where he characterises HPG as 
renouncing physical objects, of physical objects as evaporating into pure sets (p. 501-3).  An 
important point that is stressed throughout the closing chapter of Word and Object but especially in 
§54, is that ‘explication is elimination’.  This means that if the relevant theoretical purposes filled by 
a certain otherwise troublesome or otherwise unwanted form of referential words are clear and 
capable of precise formulation, and those purposes can be fulfilled by other referential words drawn 
from an accepted vocabulary lacking in such troubles, then the troublesome questions can be 
dispensed with by accepting the explication:   
We have, to begin with, an expression or form of expression that is somehow troublesome. 
It behaves partly like a term but not enough so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or it 
puts kinks in a theory or encourages one or another confusion. But also it serves certain 
purposes that are not to be abandoned. Then we find a way of accomplishing those same 
purposes through other channels, using other and less troublesome forms of expression. The 
old perplexities are resolved. (WO p. 260) 
Exhibit A is the notion of the ordered pair, whose precise purpose is to satisfy the condition that if 
<x, y> = <z, w>, then x=z and y=w.  Various set theoretic surrogates can do the job, such as Wiener’s 
<x,y> =df {{x}, {y, }} or Kuratowski’s <x,y> =df {{x}, {x, y}}.  Questions about the ordered pair are thus 
eliminated, for given such an explication we speak only of classes, not of classes-plus-pairs.  Similar 
things hold of the natural numbers and the various schemes for explicating them as classes (Frege, 
Zermelo, Von Neumann etc.).  Just as one is indifferent—beyond inessential pragmatic matters—
between Wiener’s method and Kuratowski’s, one is indifferent between the various class theoretic 
construals of natural number.   They ‘conflict with another only out among the don’t cares’ (WO p. 
260), where a ‘don’t care’ is question like whether 2  3.  So long as the explication enables one to 
do arithmetic, there are according to any such explication no further scientific questions about 
numbers.  
Quine applies the lesson of the ordered pair to the question of whether with Sir Arthur Eddington 
we should renounce bodies in favour of regions of space populated by swarms of molecules, or with 
Susan Stebbing identify the two (WO p. 265)   It’s a don’t care for Quine; he sees only a matter of 
decision.  As far as I can see much the same line can be taken about the predicate ‘x is a physical 
object’ under HPG.  Whatever serious mismatches between intuition and the HPG explication of 
physical object are already present in the initial sharpening of the intuitive notion of ‘physical object 
or body’ to the notion of a ‘material content of a region of space-time, however discontinuous or 
scattered’.  Under the envisaged HPG explication, there is no reason not to say that ‘x is a physical 
object’ is true of the things which will have replaced what on the old scheme were physical objects 
(and we can even, if we were so minded, regard ‘is an abstract object’ as false of those things).   ‘My 
left elbow is a physical object’ will be true even if the deeper nature of my elbow is to be a set of 
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quadruples (but the number two will remain a non-physical object).  We have no remaining 
questions that are not ‘don’t cares’.  We have ontological savings through shrinking the domain, thus 
obeying Occam’s maxim.    
It is all one whether, from a strictly logical point of view, we choose to identify physical objects with 
their set theoretic surrogates or to eliminate them in favour of the surrogates.  These are but two 
different ways of describing the same situation, as Quine insists.  But just as Quine identifies mental 
states with their physical correlates (at the level of tokens), rather than eliminating or repudiating 
them, simply on the grounds that it is rhetorically less harsh and revisionary, so it is with physical 
objects and their set-theoretic surrogates.    ‘[T]he distinction between an eliminative and an 
explicative physicalism is unreal’ but the former (in the case of mental states) is ‘less drastic’; WO p. 
265).   
Second, as we have seen Quine stresses that proxy-functions make a point in the epistemology of 
ontology, not ontology proper: the evidence for a chosen ontology will support to an equal degree 
any number of proxy-equivalent schemes of reference.   But as above it isn’t clear how this is an 
ontological difference, because nothing in the argument from proxy-functions alone requires that 
the overall domain of a given theory should change as we move from a given reference scheme to a 
proxy-equivalent scheme.  Suppose then we required, in addition, that for substantive ontological 
import the range of values of the proxy-function must  lie partly or wholly outside its range of 
arguments.  We would move from our universe to another, partly or wholly new.  But then we really 
would be in the unenviable position touched on earlier of having to countenance entities which are 
not real.  Quine himself makes the point (where   and ’ are the theory and its proxy):  
I must admit that my formulation suffers from a conspicuous element of make-believe. Thus, 
in the Carnap case I had to talk as if there were such things as xC … My formulation belongs, 
by its nature, in an inclusive theory that admits the objects of , as unreduced, and the 
objects of ’ on an equal footing. (ORWN p. 219) 
HPG, in embodying only a paring-down operation, is free of this ‘imperfection’ (ibid).  As before, it is 
entirely an immanent procedure, in no tension with naturalism as Quine understands it.  It is well in 
keeping with the view of ontology expressed in Word and Object but also with the somewhat 
watered down views of ontology expressed later.   
So although he came to take it back soon after, Quine may have been right when he said the 
following in the final sentence of ‘Whither Physical Objects?’:  ‘We might come to look to pure 
mathematics as the locus of ontology as a matter of course, and consider rather that the lexicon of 
natural science, not the ontology, is where the metaphysical action is’ (p. 504). 
 
5. Speaking of metaphysics, it must be allowed that the metaphysical situation is marginally 
transformed as matter of ideology under the hypo-pythagorean shift, somewhat contrary to the 
spirit of ‘save the structure and you save all’.8  It is not a case of holding all the sentences steady in 
truth-value through varying interpretations.  Although as I’ve said one can save the extensions of 
certain expressions such as ‘x is a physical object’ if one likes, nevertheless it will be an inescapable 
truth, for example, that each rabbit will contain set-theoretic members.  But that is not obviously 
more repellent to untutored intuition than that rabbits are mostly empty space or that some 
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infinities are greater than others.  And it is not so far away from rabbits’ being mereological fusions, 
as indeed many think.   
Speaking of Naturalism in the Roots of Reference, Quine writes ‘we gain access to the resources of 
natural science’, but ‘we accept the methodological restraints of natural science’ (p. 34).  We might 
add that, granted that we are all sailing on the Neurathean ship of knowledge, the philosopher is by 
no means the captain; he or she must go where the ship is going. 9   On the other hand one might see 
where the ship is headed and jump off.  One philosopher’s Modus Ponens is another’s Modus 
Tollens: granted the validity of what I’ve argued here, one might still be so wedded to rabbits not 
being sets as reason to cast aspersions on the premises in play.  One might point to the idea that all 
objects are posits.  
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1
 Frege played with what appears to be the same idea in his Grundgesetze—Frege 1892 §10, although unlike 
Quine does not restrict the notion to the first-order case.     
2
 I am skipping over Tarski use of ‘satisfaction’ for a relation between sentences, open or closed, and infinite 
sequences of objects in his [1933].  In [1956] Tarski speaks only of a simplified notion of a relation between 
open sentences or predicates and objects. Quine would often speak of ‘denotation’ for that relation. And for 
Quine the relation between a proper name and its bearer—which one might suppose is the paradigm of 
reference—is not needed for serious purposes. These are technical matters, which don’t as far as I can see 
affect what I’m saying here.   
3
The proxy-function can be a mere ‘virtual function’, not an entity within the range of quantifiers.  The key idea 
is the notion of a ‘virtual class’ as in Set Theory and Its Logic §2: Instead of ‘Fa’ we write ‘a is a member of {x: 
Fx}’.  This enables one to speak ‘of’ certain entities in a way that can be paraphrased into language without any 
actual commitment to those entities.  
4
 I thank Bruno Whittle for clarifying Quine’s thinking on this point. In further detail: It is not sufficient that for 
any selection of sets s1, …, sn, we can show that there is a function p such that for any formula G, G(s1, …, si) iff 
G*(p(s1),…,p(si)), where G* is suitably related to p.  Rather, we would have to establish that there is a function 
p such that for any sets s1, …,si, and any formula G, G(s1, …, si) iff G*(p(s1),…,p(si).  
5
 Thanks to Kenny Wraight for setting me straight on this.  
6
 For Quine, there is reason to contend that speaking of properties is more than a convenient way of 
speaking—and not just to speak of the predicates themselves or extensions of predicates and open 
sentences—only if there is a compelling reason to employ second-order quantification that somehow does an 
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essential job beyond what extensions of predicates do. There is for Quine no theoretical gain in doing so, and it 
would commit one to entities with no clear criteria of identity.  
7
 I thank Stephan Leuenberger and Adam Rieger for forcing me to be clear in this paragraph.  
8
 I thank Nathan Kirkwood for making me stress this.  
9
 Overall I owe a great deal of what I say here to Andrew Lugg, who of course is not to be blamed for it.    
